The Death of Windows phone and the Birth of Windows 10 Mobile

In 2010, the mobile world and its trends were not quite so set in stone as they now are. Apple, having started the smartphone revolution (at least according to some), was focused on the success of its newest device form factor, the iPad, regarded by many as an over-inflated phone.
Android, now arguably the undisputed lord and master of the mobile space, was a mere chit, weak legged and lacking direction. Google was vacillating, making half-hearted attempts to kick-start its tablet game, while the likes of Samsung had yet to achieve anything like the success they would go on to enjoy.

Nokia too was otherwise occupied, slowly grinding itself into the ground with poor decisions and a lack of a proper counter to the smartphone wave. In short, the time was right for a third way, a play for the blue ocean, something to completely take the consumer aback, and Microsoft was absolutely convinced it had the solution.

And it wasn’t Windows Phone.

The Kin, a tiny pebble shaped device, was the result of much investment. Carefully calculated to ignite the youth market, it had a very different look, and an OS designed to delight those who loved to share. It was a stark counterpart to the comparatively utilitarian and business focused Windows Mobile, that had enjoyed some support but had unfortunately arrived before the eventual smartphone boom. The Kin was a new start, a fresh direction, moreover, it was intended to out ‘iPhone’ the iPhone

.Still, despite Microsoft’s fresh coat of paint and new, powerful partner, the same structural weaknesses remained, and new ones began to open.

Nokia’s landslide of Windows Phone releases under the Lumia line had a somewhat unintended effect for Microsoft in that it drowned the competition. HTC and Samsung, never that committed to begin with, closed up shop, discontinuing their respective product lines.

Only Lumia was left, accounting for well over 95% of all Windows Phone devices sold. And yet, despite what efforts it had made, the slow rot that had set into Nokia years earlier began to reach its heart. This, and the losses that the firm was consistently being forced to endure, prompted drastic action on the part of its board of directors.

Thus, a deal was done, and Ballmer’s vision of Microsoft as a hardware firm came into reality, with the purchase of Nokia’s Devices and Services division for $7.2 billion. In doing this, Redmond accepted full responsibility for the direction of its OS, and also further compounded the already significant problems that continued to plague its business model.

The flood of Lumias was now the tech giant’s concern, leaving it in direct competition with what few were left, leaving no room for others.
Source: Winbeta